Serverless Security: Securing AWS Lambda, Azure Functions & Cloud Functions

SCR Security Research Team
January 21, 2026
17 min read
471 words
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The Serverless Security Paradox

Serverless computing eliminates the patching burden — no servers to manage, no OS to update. But it doesn't eliminate security. It shifts the responsibility from infrastructure security to application and configuration security.

Key Shift: In serverless, you don't manage the server, but you still own the code, the configuration, the IAM permissions, and the data flow. These are where 90% of serverless vulnerabilities live.


Serverless Threat Model

ThreatDescriptionTraditional RiskServerless Risk
OS/Kernel exploitsAttacking the server operating systemHighMinimal (provider manages)
Injection attacksSQLi, NoSQLi, command injectionHighHigh (your code, your problem)
Over-privileged IAMFunction has more permissions than neededHighVery High (most common issue)
Event injectionMalicious payloads via event sourcesN/AHigh (new attack vector)
Dependency vulnerabilitiesVulnerable libraries in functionHighHigh (still your deps)
Data exposureSensitive data in environment varsMediumHigh (common anti-pattern)
Denial of walletAttacker triggers massive invocationsN/AHigh (pay-per-invocation)

The #1 Serverless Vulnerability: Over-Privileged IAM

Most Lambda functions are deployed with far more permissions than they need:

// BAD — Overly permissive policy (common anti-pattern)
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "*",
  "Resource": "*"
}

// GOOD — Minimum required permissions
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": [
    "dynamodb:GetItem",
    "dynamodb:PutItem"
  ],
  "Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:123456789:table/UserProfiles"
}

IAM Least-Privilege Rules for Serverless:

  1. One IAM role per function (not shared across functions)
  2. Specify exact actions (not dynamodb:*)
  3. Specify exact resource ARNs (not *)
  4. Use conditions (time-based, IP-based, MFA-required where applicable)
  5. Audit permissions quarterly with IAM Access Analyzer

Event Injection Attacks

Serverless functions are triggered by events from many sources — each one is an input that must be validated:

Event SourceInjection RiskExample Attack
API GatewaySQL/NoSQL injection, XSSMalicious query parameters
S3 BucketPath traversal, code executionMalicious filename in event
SNS/SQSDeserialization, injectionPoisoned message payload
DynamoDB StreamsData manipulationModified record triggers bad logic
CloudWatch EventsNone (trusted source)Minimal risk
// VULNERABLE — Trusting S3 event data without validation
export const handler = async (event: S3Event) => {
  const key = event.Records[0].s3.object.key;
  const command = `convert /tmp/${key} /tmp/output.png`;
  exec(command);  // If key = "file; rm -rf /", command injection!
};

// SECURE — Validate and sanitize event data
export const handler = async (event: S3Event) => {
  const key = event.Records[0].s3.object.key;

  // Validate the key matches expected pattern
  if (!/^uploads\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.(jpg|png|gif)$/.test(key)) {
    throw new Error("Invalid file key");
  }

  // Use safe API instead of shell command
  await sharp(`/tmp/${path.basename(key)}`)
    .resize(800, 600)
    .toFile("/tmp/output.png");
};

Serverless Security Best Practices

PracticeImplementation
Least-privilege IAMOne role per function, exact actions + resources
Input validationValidate ALL event source data (API, S3, SQS, etc.)
Environment variablesUse Secrets Manager, not plaintext env vars for secrets
Dependency securitynpm audit / Snyk in CI/CD, minimize dependencies
Function timeoutSet minimum timeout (prevent infinite loops)
Concurrency limitsSet per-function concurrency to prevent denial-of-wallet
VPC isolationPlace functions accessing sensitive data in VPC
MonitoringCloudWatch + X-Ray for full invocation tracing

Denial-of-Wallet Attacks

Unlike traditional DDoS (denial of service), serverless enables denial-of-wallet — attackers trigger massive function invocations to run up your cloud bill.

Prevention:

  • Set concurrent execution limits per function
  • Set AWS account-level concurrency limits
  • Implement budget alerts and auto-shutdown at cost thresholds
  • Use WAF with rate limiting on API Gateway
  • Monitor invocation anomalies (> 10x baseline = alert)

Further Reading

Editorial standards

Published by SecureCodeReviews

This article is part of our original AI security and cybersecurity content library. We show publish and update dates, keep company and policy pages public, and update important guidance when material changes affect readers.

Named author: SCR Security Research Team
Published: Jan 21, 2026
Update status: current publication version

Questions or corrections?

Review our editorial standards, learn more about the company, or contact us if a page needs clarification.

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